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PARLIAMENT AND SCOTTISH MORAL LEGISLATION IN THE 1970s 
JAMES K CARNIE 
The aim of this article will be to examine the politics of Scottish Law 
reform and to explore the 'Scottish dimension' in certain areas oflegislation 
which have involved morality and conscience. Specifically, attention will be 
focused upon three Scottish 'issues of conscience' of the 1970s - the 
Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976, the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 and the 
'non-reform' in Scotland throughout the seventies of the law pertaining to 
homosexual conduct in private between consenting adults. Each of these 
issues, because of distinctive legal and cultural traditions, required separate 
Scottish legislation. Hence, they offer an interesting insight into the 
variations that can exist in policy and in the policy process for Scotland as 
compared to England and Wales. 
I. A Scottish Perspective 
To understand fully the 'Scottish dimension' in contemporary political 
issues one must first understand Scotland's unusual historical development. 
While part of a unitary British state, Scotland also enjoys a strong sense of 
national identity which derives partly from the long history of Scotland's 
existence as an independent nation-state before the Union with England 
and partly from the fact that many Scottish institutions have remained 
intact and distinctive since the union. Although the Scottish Parliament was 
abolished with the Treaty of Union in 1707, Scotland did retain a number of 
its key institutions. The Scottish legal system was preserved maintaining 
differences in law between the two countries. The Scottish education 
system was also retained with its separate principles, as was the 
Presbyterian Church of Scotland and the Scottish local government system. 
Moreover, in the years following the Union Scotland gained further 
autonomous institutions. The growth of government responsibility and the 
steady rise of nationalist sentiment in the latter half of the 19th century saw 
the creation of the Scottish Office in 1885 and the introduction of the 
Scottish Grand Committee in 1894. 
These institutions, then, have helped to preserve some of the 
distinctions between Scottish and English society and to maintain a clear 
sense of national self-consciousness in Scotland. They became 'the 
transmitters of Scottish national identity from one generation to the 
next'. (I) That Scotland has its own institutions is a commonly accepted 
proposition. The question arises, however, as to how these institutions may 
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be understood to relate to the British political system. 
According to Tom Nairn the political assimilation ofthe Scottish state, 
in conjunction with the preservation of Scottish 'civil society' created a 
distorted 'cultural sub-nationalism'. (2) The ingenuity of Nairn's analysis lies 
in his adoption of a Gramscian framework which attempts to utilise the 
concept of 'civil society' in a Scottish historical setting. Here a distinction is 
drawn between the State, i.e. the political and administrative structure, and 
'civil society' characterised by society's non-political organisations, its 
religious beliefs, its culture and customs, and its way of life generally. 
Scotland's eccentricity lies in the fact that, apart from the State itself, 'civil 
society' was guaranteed its independent existence by the Union of 1707. So 
all the institutions aforementioned- church, law, education, royal burghs-
and the dominant social classes linked to them were safeguarded, as was the 
dominant social culture they represented. The Scottish pattern of 
development, then, was of a distinct civil society not fully married to its 
State. Scotland was a nationality which resigned statehood but preserved 
an extraordinary amount of the institutional and psychological baggage 
normally associated with independence- a decapitated nation state, as it 
were, rather than an ordinary "assimilated" nation. (3) 
Under such conditions Scotland was 'stranded'. It was too much of a 
nation to become a more province; yet it was unable via nationalism to 
develop as a nation-state in its own right. Cultural repercussions arising 
from such an anomalous situation were inevitable. An anomalous historical 
situation could not engender a 'normal' national cultural evolution; instead 
it produced a stunted caricature of it in the form of a 'cultural sub-
nationalism'. This manifests itself in many ways in modern Scotland- in the 
role of the Church, in 'Kailyard' literature, in military traditions, and in the 
popular obsession with sport, especially football. As Nairn, notes 
graphically - 'the popular consciousness of separate identity, uncultivated 
by "national" experience or culture in the usual sense, has become 
curiously fixed or fossilised on the level of the image d'Epinal and Auld 
Lang Syne, of the Scott Monument, Andy Stewart and the "Sunday Post", 
- to the point of forming a huge, virtually self-contained universe of 
Kitsch'.(4) 
The peculiar position of Scottish civil society, then, too developed and 
too distinct to be assimilated, yet no longer requiring to form a State of its 
own, has led to a series of developmental oddities. Here Christopher Smout 
observes the paradox: 
'The history of the Union enshrines the continuing central paradox of 
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the Scottish identity. It bears witness to the survival of an elemental 
nationalist consciousness that Scotland is not England; and on the 
other hand it carries the apparently opposing consciousness that 
Scotland and England are linked within a national British entity'. (s) 
Thus, Scottish development has been a case of assimilation in politics 
but separation in social mores. While Scottish society by virtue of its 
anomalous mode of development can be said to possess a distinctive 
political culture, can it also be said to manifest, as James Kellas would 
argue, a distinctive political system? 
The issue which is at the heart of the matter in the Scottish context is 
the question of system survival. (6) It is important here to consider a 
distinction between system-maintenance (maintenance of a particular kind 
of political system) and system-persistence (persistence of some kind of 
political system).(?) Suffice to suggest at this stage that while the particular 
pre-1707 Scottish political system failed to be maintained by the Treaty of 
Union, an argument can be made that a political system of some kind did 
persist post -1707, given that the bulk of Scottish society remained intact as a 
result of the process of assimilation discussed above. This, of course, begs 
the question, what kind of political system? 
A political system 'is capable of identification from actions, roles and 
institutions appertaining to goal attainment'. (B) This comment from Nett! is 
fine in as far as it goes, but what has to be remembered in the Scottish 
context is the dualism subsumed in goal attainment, that is in some 
instances goals will be predominantly Scottish, while in others they will be 
predominantly British. As Kellas has pointed out the Scottish 'political 
system' acts as a means of communication with the larger British system, as 
well as being a communications and decision-making network within 
Scotland itself in those areas of politics where British interests are not so 
involved. The concept of a 'political system' as applied to Scotland must, 
therefore, take account of these two 'activity areas'- the Scottish and the 
British. The Scottish system can thus be viewed as being both dependent 
and independent within the British system. Michael Keating has 
emphasised this point: 
'The Scottish political system is both dependent and independent 
within the British system and can at one time be regarded as a sub-
system of the Scottish social system and, therefore, a political system 
in its own right (as when legislation concerning Scots law or local 
government is being enacted) and at another time as a sub-system of 
the British political system (as when UK legislation is being modified 
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to suit Scottish conditions, or demands are being made upon the UK 
system). No clear model then exists to which the Scottish political 
system conforms and the system is indeed unique in trying to provide 
for the maximum degree of autonomy within a unitary state and 
Parliament'. (9) 
The problem, however, is that of defining the boundary between the 
systems since it is not always clear whether it is the British system or the 
Scottish system which is determining policies for Scotland. For instance, 
even in areas of administrative autonomy there is some need to conform 
with the corresponding policies in England. It is not possible, therefore, for 
Scotland to diverge too far from the norms established in the rest of Britain. 
For instance, while moral issues are matters largely for debate within the 
Scottish 'political system', the boundary between the Scottish and British 
system breaks down to some extent through ' the awareness of English 
practices, the increasing assimilation of Scottish society to that of England, 
and the desire in Great Britain to establish "equal rights" for all citizens'. (IO) 
The case studies to be examined here on Scottish 'issues of conscience' 
- licensing, divorce and homosexuality - illustrate these particular 
dilemmas. Being issues which require separate legislation pertaining only 
to Scotland they highlight the way in which the Scottish 'political system' 
can operate in an independent capacity. Yet, they also serve to 
demonstrate that even when operating in this 'independent' capacity the 
Scottish 'political system' is often dependent upon the larger British 
political system at critical moments in the policy process. Thus, in order to 
understand the development of policy in the areas in question one has to 
disaggregate the Scottish political system and explore the interactions of 
some of the actors and organisations involved. 
Of course, Parliament itself highlights this interaction between the 
Scottish and British systems. A distinctive legislative procedure exists for 
Scottish Bills involving the Scottish Grand Committee (for general and 
second reading debates) and the First and Second Scottish Standing 
Committees (for detailed scrutiny of legislation). In addition a Select 
Committee on Scottish Affairs has investigatory powers to scrutinise any 
aspect of Scottish business through public examination of witnesses and 
documents. But the division between Scottish and British business is not as 
clear cut as might first appear since Scottish business often has to compete 
for parliamentary time on the floor of the House as a whole and this can 
lead to frustraing bottlenecks. 
Pressure group activity is another area where an interaction between 
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the two systems is to be found. On certain matters pressure groups wiu 
choose to make representations at a UK level directly into the British 
political system while on others, especially those only relevant to Scotland, 
representations will fall largely within the sphere of the Scottish political 
system with pressure being focused on the Scottish Office. The Scottish 
Office, then, is of particular significance in the Scottish 'political system'. It 
can, because of its position, influence and control the political demands 
made upon the system in such a way as to affect both the formulation and 
implementation of policy. This control does not necessarily have to be overt 
but can be circumstantial in that administrative 'style' can influence policy 
output. Hence the values of those in power can be influential in the setting 
of priorities and can have a significant bearing on the types of issue which 
emerge, and indeed do not emerge, onto the political agenda for 
consideration and public discussion. 
II. Approaches to Policy Analysis 
In explaining policy development in the case studies, the approach 
adopted here is based on the notion that the making of policy is both an 
intellectual activity and an institutional process. Decisions that influence 
policy are the products of individual minds in so far as problems must be 
perceived and defined by individual policy-makers. New policies can then 
be created on the basis of those perceptions. Yet the making of public 
policy is also an institutional process whereby policy-makers possess 
authority to resolve public issues only by virtue of their positions in political 
institutions. Policy often does change in response to shifting intellectual 
currents, but institutional realities can impinge upon the extent to which 
new ideas penetrate the political world and influence public policy. Thus, 
policy innovations can also be the outcome of political conflict and of 
bargains struck between established political interests. 
One idea which is gaining increasing popularity in much of the newer 
policy literature is that more than a single account is required to describe all 
the different aspects of policy-making and organisational life. Thus, it may 
be that a combination of approaches is better utilised to explain policy 
developments. Richard Simeon, for instance, contends that 'no one single 
clear and simple explanation of something as many faceted and as huge as 
modern government is likely to be possible'. (II) This is echoed by Keith 
Banting who similarly argues that 'our understanding of policy 
determinants can be refined further by abandoning the assumption that 
there is a single "policy process" operating identically throughout an 
individual policy change and over all policies'. (Ill By adopting a variety of 
approaches to deal with the complexity of the policy process one can 
53 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1986 
incorporate such concepts as systems analysis, group theory, demand 
regulation, agenda management, 'non-decision-making', and value 
judgements in explaining policy formulation 
What is of interest to us is identifying the balance of forces which 
prevailed in the different phases and different types of policy which are to 
be examined. By looking at the issues from the perspective of group theory 
and demand regulation it is possible to see how the 'package' of interests 
associated with a particular policy option can affect whether the option is 
adopted or rejected. Moreover, various 'rules of the game' emerge to 
govern the relationship between organisations and the bureaucracy and to 
regulate demands. Being in a pivotal position in the channel of 
communications, the bureaucracy has the power to influence inputs into 
the policy process and to set the political agenda. And in understanding 
why some issues emerge on to the political agenda it is also important to 
consider why certain issues do not emerge. In this capacity the concept of 
'non-decision-making', although not without its difficulties and dangers, 
can be usefully employed to help reveal some of the more covert aspects of 
politics and can help to provide a focus on values in problem identification 
and definition. As WI Jenkins has pointed out- 'non-issues, non-decisions 
and even non-policies are necessary and legitimate subjects for 
examination'. (13l 
Since what you see depends on where you are and which way you are 
looking this combination of approaches provides a means by which to 
disaggregate and explore some of the component parts of the Scottish 
'political system' as they manifest themselves in the studies. Although 
Scotland has the administrative capacity to initiate distinctive policies the 
achievement in terms of substantive policy appears to be modest. The 
studies here - on licensing, divorce and homosexuality - will consider to 
what extent this is true for 'issues of conscience'. While perhaps not wholly 
typical of independent Scottish policy formulation, the cases, because they 
reputedly fall within the Scottish 'political system', nevertheless offer a 
chance to explore, as compared with the rest of Britain, what, if any, 
variations exist in the substantive policy areas under consideration and in 
the political and administrative processes by which those policies came to 
be formulated. Further, since each of the measures gave rise to divisions in 
which MPs were free to vote according to individual conscience rather than 
by Party Whip, they provide some insight into the social and moral attitudes 
which prevailed in Scottish politics at the time. 
At this juncture it may be worth reiterating, and indeed emphasising, 
that in examining Parliament's handling of these moral issues, we may not 
54 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1986 
necessarily be witnessing Parliament's typical role in policy formulation. 
For the most part Parliament's typical role is restricted, the bulk of policies 
appearing before it as 'fait accomplis' having been formulated by the 
Executive, its bureaucracy and inner elites. Only when a broader societal 
concensus is required does Parliament begin to be able to influence the 
shape of policy. That said however, there has been in recent years 
considerable debate over the changing role of Parliament. 
At one end of the spectrum is the argument put forward by Douglas 
Ashford. (14l This points to the primary of the Executive and its bureaucracy 
in the formulation of policy. The increased importance of the government 
as a regulatory economic force, the tendency towards corporate decision-
making and the increased complexity of the entire structure of government 
have led to the decline in importance of direct democratic control through 
Parliament. The unique characteristic of the British political system 
according to Ashford is the high premium placed on adversarial behaviour 
at the uppermost levels of decision-making. Not only has the Opposition 
few ways to intervene in policy choices but even the backbench supporters 
of the governing majority in Parliament are to a great extent excluded from 
policy making. In Ashford's view 'Parliament can do little more than cope 
with the consequences of policy-making as eventually perceived by the 
public'. (1S) 
At the other end of the spectrum lies Philip Norton's view. (16l Norton is 
critical of the widespread conception of the House of Commons as a body 
that provides unquestioning assent for the decisions of government. 
Further, he questions the idea that the initiation and formulation of 
legislation is something largely, if not almost exclusively, undertaken by 
government. While this may have been true for a good part of the 20th 
century it is not, in Norton's eyes, really applicable to the politics of the 
1970s and early 1980s which seem to have been of a rather different 
character. 
Various proposals for parliamentary reform originated in the 1960s 
and were advanced in an attempt to make effective Parliament's function of 
scrutiny and influence. These were based on 'the perceived lowly and 
inadequate role played by the Commons in the political process' and aimed 
to make internal changes to the workings of Parliament.0 7l However, by 
the 1970s there was marked dissatisfaction with this limited internal 
approach and as a result the pressure for reform became far more reaching. 
This pressure was exacerbated by the indecisiveness of the 1974 General 
Elections. 
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Norton's view emphasises the 'importance of attitudes within 
Parliament, and the potential and actual power available already to 
Members, as the basis on which the Commons might achieve an effective 
role of scrutiny and influence'. <18) This idea draws on the experience of 
parliamentary behaviour in the 1970s which does reveal MPs increased 
willingness to dissent against the Government line. Government 
backbenchers, under both Conservative and Labour administrations, 
proved willing to enter Opposition lobbies to impose defeats on their own 
front bench. And as the decade progressed, the greater was the awareness 
on the part of Members of what they could achieve. So much so in fact, that 
one irony is that had it not been for dissent in the 1974-79 Parliament by a 
number of Labour Members, Britain would now possess a new 
constitutional framework involving a devolved Scottish Assembly. Thus, 
despite the disparagement of Parliament, Norton argues that the House of 
Commons can and does have a role to play in the political process and that 
the key to more effective scrutiny and influence lies with MPs themselves. 
There exist, then these differing conceptions of the role of Parliament 
and this can give rise to ambiguity and confusion concerning its functions of 
scrutiny and influence over policy. That it has ceased to form a regular part 
of the decision-making process, however, is readily conceded even by 
Norton. Nevertheless, he identified it 'as occupying an unusual place in the 
British political process, having an important relationship with, yet not 
being a major part of, the decision-making process'. <19) It is the nature of 
this (unusual) relationship which will be explored further in the case 
studies. 
III. The Case Studies 
a) Licensing Law Reform 
A typical manifestation of the 'cultural neurosis' referred to earlier is 
the attitude in Scotland towards the use and consumption of alcohol. The 
nature of the problem arises from the ambivalent attitude which Scots hold 
towards drink. Studies have shown that various ethnic gr9ups exhibit 
different rates of alcoholism and drinking pathologies. <20) The attempts to 
explain these differences are many and varied, but one of the main 
explanations put forward is the cultural one. This perspective stresses the 
social meaning and function of alcohol, drinking and drunkenness and 
describes how different patterns of alcohol use have emerged in different 
societies. In this respect Scotland is classified as a 'ambivalent culture', 
where attitudes to the use of alcohol are contradictory in that there are two 
directly opposed value systems in relation to the use of alcohol operating in 
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Scottish culture at the same time. <21 ) 
The source of this confusion and the reason for the existence of two 
simultaneous but contradictory attitudes is that alcohol has a double 
identity. It is both a drug and a symbol and it is when the drug effects of 
alcohol are at variance with its presumed symbolic function that problems 
relating to its use and abuse arise. The myths which surround alcohol are 
many- myths of toughness, of maturity, of sophistication, of sexuality. 
These are manifestations of a set of deep-rooted symbolic values which 
have grown and developed in Scotland over centuries. However, 
competing against these myths has been a strong Calvinist anti-drink 
tradition expressed in the history of the evangelical temperance 
movements. These temperance leagues warned of the evils of drink and 
offered salvation through strict adherence to abstinence, Protestantism, 
the Sabbath and the Scottish family way of life. The product of this history 
of ambivalence is the disproportionately high incidence of alcohol-related 
problems in modern Scotland. 
The Scottish Health Education Group has suggested that alcohol 
consumption rates tend to be particularly high where there is social 
pressure to drink; inconsistent or non-existent social sanctions against 
excessive drinking; drinking outside a family or religious setting; and 
ambivalence towards moderate drinking. It comments: 
'All those conditions are fulfilled in Scotland today. When they are 
viewed in the context of a rigorously enforced Protestant ethic, a 
fierce and sometimes embittered patriotism and a comparatively 
inimical climate, it is easy to see how the functional aspects of 
drinking behaviour have become unextricably tangled with a host of 
compensatory and guilt-provoking feelings. These have acquired 
separate symbolic associations and have served to make drinking an 
activity qualitatively of considerable importance to the self-esteem of 
the individual and of the nation'. <22) 
It was in such a context that the Clayson Committee was appointed 
in 1970 to review the liquor licensing laws and to recommend what 
changes might be made in the public interest. The Committee's approach 
was developed from a three-fold analysis of the controls available to 
prevent the misuse of alcohol. These controls were categorised as social, 
fiscal and legislative. While acknowledging that such controls were inter-
related the Clayson Report was led to comment that 'in present Scottish 
circumstances it is in the area of social controls over drinking practice that 
improvement is most required if the serious problem of alcohol misuse is to 
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be ameliorated'. <23l To this end the role of licensing was to strengthen SQcial 
controls 'by helping in the formation of public attitudes to alcohol and 
modifications of practice in its use'. <24l 
Understandably, the Clayson recommendations which attracted most 
public attention were those concerned with permitted hours of opening. In 
keeping with its commitment to liberalisation the Committee 
recommended opening hours of 11 a.m. to 11 p.m. weekdays and 12.30 
p.m. to 11 p.m. Sundays, with Sunday opening being extended to public 
houses. Reaching this decision involved compromising between various 
pressure group demands. On the one hand a minority of groups including 
the Church of Scotland argued that the law should further restrict the 
distribution and availability of alcohol. On the other, a majority, including 
those such as the Scottish Tourist Board, the Brewers Association of 
Scotland and the Association of Chief Police Officers (Scotland), favoured 
relaxation although views differed quite markedly as to how far and in what 
way permitted hours should be extended. 
After a period of formal consultation between the Government and 
interested parties on the content of a Report, it is ultimately the 
Government which decides the Report's fate. Thus, in the same way as the 
Committee acted as a regulator of demands in producing the Report, the 
Report itself became the object of demand regulation as it competed for 
attention and a place on the political agenda. Published in August 1973, the 
Clayson Report eventually came up for debate in the Scottish Grand 
Committee in April 1975. This was followed later in the year with a 
Government commitment to legislate on licensing. However, the proposed 
legislation announced by the then Secretary of State for Scotland, Willie 
Ross, in October 1975 differed in some important respects from the 
recommendations made by Dr Clayson. For instance, although there was 
an endorsement of the extension of hours to 11 p.m. there was considerable 
divergence on a number of issues with no opening of public houses on a 
Sunday, retention of the statutory afternoon break and the closing of off-
sales at 8 p.m. 
Once the commitment to legislate was announced pressure group 
activity on the licensing issue picked up. Perhaps the strangest example of 
lobbying came from the Strathclyde Licensed Trade Association, who for 
some bizarre reason saw fit to lobby both the Government and the 
Opposition with contrary proposals. Also there was an instance of some 
rather unsophisticated lobbying by a commercial off-sales organisation on 
the subject of opening hours which amounted to little more than a crude 
attempt at political blackmail. And there was the example of ineffectual 
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late lobbying by the Church of Scotland when it only made its 
representations on Sunday opening of pubs after the decision to open had 
been taken by Parliament. Obviously, the effect different pressure groups 
had on individual decisions varied but a particularly important factor in 
determining a group's influence appeared to be its social standing and 
political weight within the community since such status facilitated 
participation in the consultation process. 
While licensing was a Government provision it was also allowed a free 
vote. In parliamentary terms this is a rather unusual combination. Unlike 
the majority of other issues involving free votes, it did not have to compete 
in the lottery for Private Members' time. The guarantee of time for 
adequate debate gave the measure a distinct advantage in completing its 
legislative passage. Also the use of the Scottish Grand Committee at critical 
points in its development assisted the licensing reform onto the statute 
book. For instance, the Scottish Grand Committee provided a useful forum 
for debating the general principles of the Clayson Report helping to keep 
the issue to the fore and acting as a sounding board for Scottish 
parliamentary opinion. Again, the use of the Scottish Grand Committee to 
take the Second Reading of the Licensing Bill in 1976 further facilitated its 
passage by removing it from the crowded timetable on the Floor of the 
House. 
The passage of the licensing legislation through Parliament generated 
a number of novel cross-party alliances between individual MPs. Imagine 
for instance, Teddy Taylor (Conservative), Donald Stewart (SNP), David 
Steel (Liberal), and Willie Ross (Labour) all voting on the same side 
against the Sunday opening of pubs. Or George Younger and Alex Fletcher 
(both Conservative) voting with Dennis Canavan and Neil Carmichael 
(both Labour) in favour of Sunday opening. Parliament and individual 
MPs, then, had a rather more important role to play in deciding upon policy 
options than the 'rubber stamp' role with which they are usually associated 
when party political matters involving the Whips are concerned. Several 
MPs made influential contributions which affected the outcome of 
particular decisions. For example, Malcolm Rifkind's eloquent argument 
in favour of the Sunday opening of pubs was of considerable importance in 
getting that amendment carried. Also, Dennis Canavan and Michael Clark 
Hutchison featured prominently in the campaign to reverse the decision to 
allow the police unrestricted entry to private clubs. And the influential 
contributions from the late J P Mackintosh were of immense importance in 
setting the tone and widening the parameters of the debate. In short, these 
men and their arguments prevailed because they best reflected the 
changing popular mood of Scotland. The Scots were tired of being what 
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they perceived to be second-class citizens. They were, after all, asking for 
no more than England already possessed. Scotland was in a vibrant, 
energetic and expectant mood in the mid-1970s. The prospect of devolution 
and an Assembly lay ahead. That the Scots were no longer prepared to 
tolerate the Calvinist orthodoxy towards drink was just one more 
manifestation of a growing (albeit short-lived) self-assurance. 
b) Divorce Law Reform 
Divorce reform is another issue which has to be viewed in the context 
of the political climate in Scotland in the 1970s and also in the context of 
Scottish history. It has already been noted that after the Union of 1707, 
Scotland not only retained distinctions in certain areas of law but also 
preserved some of the differences in social mores. The divorce issue 
highlights these differences yet at the same time illustrates the ·duality in 
Scottish politics of being both dependent and independent within the 
British system. 
The parameters of the divorce debate were very much set by the events 
in England. The appearance of the Church of England's 'Putting Asunder' 
in 1966 and the Law Commission's review 'The Field of Choice' set out the 
main options for consideration. (Zs) The following year the Scottish Law 
Commission's 'Divorce: The Grounds Considered' more or less adopted 
the same recommendations, revising them only to meet the requirements of 
Scots Law.<26) Briefly, the Scottish Law Commission argued that divorce 
should not be regarded as a punitive measure, but rather as a recognition 
that a marriage was dead and ought to be buried with the minimum of 
embarrassment, humiliation and bitterness. A marriage was to be judged at 
an end when it had irretrievably broken down and it was enough that one 
partner maintained irretrievable breakdown for the breakdown to be a fact. 
Divorce was to be granted upon proof of one of several grounds including 
the new ground of separation, where divorce would be available after a 
period of two years' separation when both spouses consented, or after a 
period of five years when one spouse objected, subject to certain 
safeguards. However, the most radical proposals of all came from the 
Church of Scotland in 1968. (Z?) The Church agreed that divorce should be 
granted on the irretrievable breakdown of marriage, but argued that 
separation for a continuous period of two years, consequent upon a 
decision of at least one of the parties not to live with the other, should act as 
the sole evidence of marriage breakdown. 
While south of the border the Church of England and the Law 
Commission were able to find common ground and work out a set of 
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compromise recommendations which were eventually to form the basis of 
the reformed English law, the Church of Scotland and the Scottish Law 
Commission found it much more difficult to reach this common position. 
The result was that while both the Church of Scotland and the Scottish Law 
Commission, and indeed the Law Society of Scotland and the Faculty of 
Advocates, favoured reform, none could agree which type of reform would 
be most appropriate. With no common ground there was a lack of unified 
(or uniform) pressure for change throughout the first half of the seventies. 
And of course the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland, because of its 
doctrinal teachings, was single minded in its opposition to any proposed 
reform. This influence seems to have had an effect on at least some MPs. 
The attitudes of different Labour and Conservative administrations 
were also of particular importance to the success or failure of the various 
reform attempts. There is no doubt whatsoever that the allocation of 
parliamentary time to the English Divorce Reform Bill in the 1968-69 
Session was crucial to the success of that provision. This was a feature of the 
1966-70 Labour administration which gave additional time to other Private 
Members' Bills considered to merit fuller public debate than Private 
Members' business allowed. The liberal attitudes of the Home Secretary of 
the period, Roy Jenkins, and the Government Chief Whip, John Silken, 
had much to do with this generosity. In stark contrast the 1970-74 
Conservative government made it known that Private Members' legislation 
would have to stand or fall on its own merits since no extra parliamentary 
time would be forthcoming, irrespective of the perceived importance of the 
issue. And this stance was maintained by Labour's Willie Ross when he 
returned to head the Scottish Office in 1974. 
Since divorce was a subject for Private Members' legislation, the role 
of individual MPs was again of paramount importance. Without any doubt 
the most influential MP in the English divorce reform was Leo Abse. He 
was the one who rekindled the debate in the early sixties, later persuaded 
first William Wilson and then Alec Jones to promote Private Member's 
Bills and who cajoled the Labour Cabinet (through Jenkins and Silkin) into 
granting additional parliamentary time for debate. In the protracted 
struggle for Scottish reform (there were seven attempts in all) a number of 
Scots MPs featured prominently. Donald Dewar, Robert Hughes, Willie 
Hamilton and Robin Cook were all active in urging divorce reform in the 
early and mid-seventies. However, the most influential figure in the 
Scottish divorce issue did not reside in the ranks of the supporters of 
reform, but in the opposing ranks. Tam Galbraith single-handedly opposed 
the progress of a number of Divorce Bills on countless occasions. 
Ironically, his dogged opposition may have had the reverse effect from that 
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intended- by focusing public opinion on the need for reform he may have 
unwittingly become the catalyst for its eventual success. 
Of course, public interest in a Bill can affect its chances of success. In 
the case of Scottish divorce reform public opinion and its influence was 
open to varying interpretations. On the one hand, some MPs felt that th~ 
fact that a Bill had been introduced in virtually every Parliamentary Sesston 
of the first half of the 1970s was indicative of a public desire for reform; 
whereas on the other, opposing feeling was that the continued failure of 
Private Members' legislation was an indication that opinion was against it. 
Needless to say those who adopted the former position tended to support 
reform while those who favoured the latter interpretation were inclined to 
oppose it. Thus, what MPs thought about public opinion on the divorce 
issue depended a great deal on their own values and beliefs and on who they 
took to represent public opinion. As Hall et al have noted- 'assumptions 
about the pervasiveness of certain public values and beliefs are moulded by 
the values and beliefs of those who do the judging, as well as by the sources 
from which they obtain their information'. (ZS) The tendency therefore, was 
for MPs to quote that section of public opinion which did most to support 
their personal predilections. That is why, during the debates, there was 
such confusion as to the state of Scottish public opinion, because very often 
MPs would be using different sources and talking at cross purposes. 
While there were clear differences in the way in which the divorce 
reforms were enacted north and south of the border, the differences in 
policy content, at least in terms of the general principles, were not so 
obvious. What differences did exist lay largely in the technical and legal 
requirements of Scots Law. The Scottish divorce reform then was very 
much influenced by the norms which already prevailed south of the border. 
Separate Scottish laws may engender separate politics and administration, 
but they need not always engender separate policies. Yet, the swing in 
popular and parliamentary opinion and the acceptance of divorce reform 
resulted from changing social and political circumstances which effectively 
increased native awareness of Scotland's perceived 'disadvantages'. A 
sense of injustice developed in the mid-1970s concerning both the nature of 
the reform and the procedure available to obtain it. Not only was it a case of 
Scotland not having as liberal a law as prevailed in England, it was also 
another manifestation of the wider search for a Scottish identity, political 
and otherwise. Scottish business in Parliament was being brought into 
question as part of the much broader debate on constitutional reform. 
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c) Homosexual Law Reform 
The issue of homosexuality and the 'non-reform' of the law in Scotland 
throughout the seventies is another case which has to be viewed in the wider 
context of Scottish history and politics. Again it is a case which highlights 
Scotland's need for certain types of legislation to be framed separately in 
the idiom of Scots Law; illustrates the way in which social mores can vary 
north and south ofthe border; and demonstrates Scotland's dualism within 
the British political system by acting dependently in attempting to obtain a 
legislative reform but independently in its administrative interpretation 
and implementation of the prevailing law. 
As with divorce, the original pressures for homosexual law reform 
emanated from England. It was the Church of England in conjunction with 
the Howard League for Penal Reform which initiated the setting up of the 
Wolfenden Committee and it was this Report which set the tone of the 
debate in the late fifties and the sixties. (29l The central recommendation of 
Wolfenden was that homosexual acts between consenting male adults in 
private should be decriminalised. This liberalising recommendation, 
however, was not particularly well received north of the border. A 
deliverance of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1958 
came out firmly against any revision of the homosexuality laws, and this 
remained the Church's policy for the next ten years until1968. It was not in 
fact until after the success in England of Leo Abse's Sexual Offences Act in 
1967 that the Church of Scotland was forced to completely revise its 
thinking on the homosexuality issue. Thereafter, some tentative liberal 
pressure for reform began to emerge in Scotland with the establishment of 
the Scottish Minorities Group in 1969. Set up with the aim of promoting 
social and legal equality for homosexuals, it was this pressure group which 
was at the forefront of the campaign for reform throughout the 1970s. The 
problem of overcoming public opinion apart, the SMG's main obstacle to 
achieving a legislative reform of the law in Parliament was the Lord 
Advocate's policy of 'no prosecutions'. 
It was Wolfenden which identified the lower rate of prosecutions in 
Scotland for homosexual offences committed in private and attributed it to 
the differences in criminal procedure either side of the border. From at 
least this time (and perhaps even earlier) the policy of the Lord Advocate in 
Scotland was one of 'no prosecutions' against consenting male adults in 
private. This administrative discretion of the Lord Advocate lay at the very 
heart of the matter. It meant that although homosexual acts in private 
between consenting adults remained on the statute book as a criminal 
offence, the strict letter of the law was not being enforced. Supporters of 
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this discretion argued that prior to 1967 Scotland was actually in a more 
advanced position in relation to England, and that after 1967 it was at least 
on level terms. Opponents though, pointed out that such an arrangement 
not only brought the law into disrepute, but also placed homosexuals in 
Scotland at a disadvantage since it was not possible to guarantee that a 'no 
prosecutions' policy would be continued by future Lords Advocate. 
Whichever way it is viewed there can be no doubt that the interpretation of 
the law in this way by successive Lords Advocate was one of the main 
reasons why there was no parliamentary reform in the 1970s. There had 
been an administrative reform, but no legislative reform. And to a 
considerable extent the situation was compounded by the Sexual Offences 
Consolidation in 1976 which by bringing together a number of old statutes 
in one consolidated Act, reinforced the illogicality of maintaining an 
activity as a criminal offence, indulgence in which would not be liable to 
prosecution. This codification appeared to some as a modem 
'endorsement' of an old law and was viewed as being at odds with the 
publicly stated policy of 'no prosecutions'. 
The role of the individual MP was again of vital importance in 
eventually achieving reform. Both the Earl of Arran and Lord Boothby 
made influential contributions to the debate, but the principal actors were 
Leo Abse in the English context and Robin Cook in the Scottish. Although 
their influence on events was some thirteen years apart, there exists a quite 
remarkable parallel between the two men. While the respective reforms 
emerged under different procedural conditions it was largely through their 
quick-witted opportunism and political alertness that change was achieved. 
Both engaged in lengthy personal campaigns to keep the issue alive in 
Parliament and both encountered the same type of hostile opposition. This 
opposition desperately wished to remove the issue from the agenda, but 
only succeeded in revealing its prejudices and anxieties about the subject. 
Both Abse and Cook handled such opposition with similar style and wit to 
keep the tone of the debate as calm and as unemotive as possible, and in so 
doing managed to shape a climate of opinion conducive to reform. 
Parliamentary procedure was another factor which influenced the 
outcome of homosexual law reform both north and south of the border. As 
with the divorce issue, the granting of extra parliamentary time for debate 
by the 1966-70 Labour administration was crucial to the success of the 
English reform. However, no such extra time was forthcoming in the 1970s 
for worthy Private Members' legislation from either Conservative or 
L&bour administrations. Consequently, the reform procedure in Scotland 
was nothing if not novel. With no one in successive Ballots apparently 
prepared to take up the issue, with the repeated failure to get the matter off 
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the ground through the Ten-Minute Rule procedure and with Bills 
introduced in the Lords failing through time, Robin Cook ingeniously put a 
reform clause into the middle of a Government Bill -the Criminal Justice 
(Scotland) Bill. This caused not a little controversy, but it was nonetheless 
procedurally in order. While the Secretary of State, George Younger, 
questioned whether it was the most appropriate way to legislate on the 
issue, he had little option but to accept the situation and declare a free vote, 
although not before he had obliquely directed members of his own party 
not to vote for this clause. While this put some pro-reform Conservatives in 
an embarrassing position it did not seriously hamper the progress of the 
measure which was carried comfortably by 205 votes to 82 (of which there 
was a Scottish majority of 34 votes to 16 also in favour). 
When comparisons are drawn between Scotland and England there 
are not many differences to be found in the general principles of the 
respective enactments. As in the case of divorce, the same considerations 
applied: should Scotland be content to 'catch up' and draw itself into line 
with prevailing practice in England or should it consider alternative policies 
to meet its own particular requirements? Glimpses of alternative policies 
did appear, for instance, in the proposal to reduce the age of consent the 
heterosexual norm of 16, but in the end the 'standardisation' approach 
prevailed, probably because homosexuality is not a subject which most 
MPs feel inclined to be radical about. 
The glaring difference between the reforms, of course, was that they 
were thirteen years apart. Certainly in Abse's case parliamentary opinion 
was more definitely formed on the issue and once he could demonstrate 
support he was able to extract parliamentary time from a sympathetic 
administration. Roy Jenkins, the Home Secretary of the period, defended 
the allocation of parliamentary time thus: 
'Had we not taken this course, we should have found ourselves faced 
with the anomaly that the sanction of the criminal law continued to 
apply to acts which Parliament no longer considered to be criminal 
and that solely because of the hazards of the Private Members' Bill 
procedure the law could not be changed'. (JO) 
However, to all intents and purposes that was the situation which 
prevailed in Scotland throughout the seventies. The unirnate irony was that 
while the anomaly was used to justify parliamentary time for reform south 
of the border, in the Scots instance that very anomaly (an extant criminal 
statute but a policy of 'no prosecutions') was subsequently used to deny the 
need for reform and to justify what was tantamount to a 'non-decision' 
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IV Conclusion 
One of the ideas that the case studies have tried to illustrate is that the 
making of policy is both an intellectual activity and an institutional process. 
All three cases have shown that decisions which influenced policy were the 
products of individual minds which perceived and defined problems and 
created new policies on the basis of those perceptions. Yet policy was also 
an institutional process whereby policy-makers derived authority from, and 
had to operate within, the political institutions of which they were a part. 
The cases of divorce and homosexuality in particular have demonstrated 
that while policy did alter as a response to intellectual appraisal, 
institutional realities also affected the extent to which new ideas penetrated 
the political world and upon the way in which they were assimilated into 
public policy. 
In these cases parliament and individual MPs have had a rather more 
important role to play in deciding policy options than the 'rubber stamp' 
role with which they are usually associated. In this regard the studies, being 
both issues of conscience and issues of the 1970s, tend to support Norton's 
view that Parliament is not always impotent in influencing policy outcomes. 
The innovative roles of Robin Cook and Leo Abse are particularly good 
examples of Norton's idea that channels of influence already exist within 
parliament but that these channels are only effective if MPs show 
themselves willing (and knowledgeable enough) to use them. 
However, even Norton concedes that Parliament has ceased to form a 
regular part of the decision-making process. Ashford's thesis then, is not 
necessarily refuted by these instances as they could be incorporated into his 
analysis as reasonable exceptions. What Norton's account does illustrate is 
that the Opposition in the seventies, because of the changing balance of 
power, had a greater opportunity to intervene in law-making and policy 
choices. In other words it shows that through dissent government action 
could be prevented. What these cases have tried to demonstrate are some 
of the difficulties involved when parliament tries to initiate policy change or 
legislation in face of a reluctant Executive. So it would appear as though the 
power of veto comes more readily to Parliament than the power of 
initiative. Yet, however limited it may be, Parliament did exert and still 
does exert some influence in the decision-making process. As Norton 
comments, 'the House of Commons certainly cannot be written off as 
irrelevant'. (}l) 
Finally, the studies have gone some way in illustrating how the Scottish 
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'political system' can be both dependent and independent within the larger 
British political system. It can be seen that there are times when Scotland 
can act independently to formulate policies to meet its own particular 
domestic requirements, but that even when it does so there still remains an 
element of dependence both in its demands upon parliamentary time and in 
the need to conform by and large to similar policies south of the border. 
There is then, in Scottish history, politics and culture a distinctive dualism 
which has prompted from Tom Nairn the graphic description that Scotland 
is really 'an unclassifiable marginal aberration'. 
James K Carnie. Department of Social Administration, University of , 
Edinburgh. 
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